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In Washington, the stars may align to help Riyadh’s nuclear ambitions

Saudi Arabia’s path to nuclear power has been complicated. The Trump administration can ease the way

Donald Trump and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman shake hands at a G20 summit during the president's first term. Trump's new team can work on a uranium deal with Riyadh Bandar Algaloud/Courtesy of Saudi Royal Court/Handout via Reuters
Donald Trump and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman shake hands at a G20 summit during the president's first term. Trump's new team can work on a uranium deal with Riyadh

The UAE’s nuclear reactors are humming away happily, contributing stable, secure low-carbon electricity. Saudi Arabia’s energy minister says his country intends to export enriched uranium. Are the two governments taking advantage of a global nuclear renaissance?

At the Cop28 climate summit in 2023, a group of 25 countries including the UAE and US – but not Saudi Arabia – agreed a goal of trebling nuclear power by 2050.

They recognise its advantages as a large-scale provider of electricity with near-zero greenhouse gas emissions, which is largely independent of weather or the seasons.

Nuclear power has been widely criticised as too slow and expensive in coming to market. That is usually true in the US and Europe, where the few plants constructed in recent years have run badly over time and suffered huge cost escalations. China and South Korea have a much more positive experience.

The UAE published its position paper on the domestic use of nuclear power in 2008 – and began building the 5.6-gigawatt Barakah nuclear plant in July 2012 with Korea Electric Power Corporation (Kepco).

Barakah started generating in April 2021 and its fourth unit began commercial operations in September 2024.

It was an impressive achievement for the country’s first nuclear plant to remain reasonably on time and budget, despite the Covid pandemic and some problems at Kepco.

Before construction started, the UAE needed a so-called 123 agreement with the US – because the APR-1400 reactor built by Kepco contains substantial American technology.

In the December 2009 deal, the UAE agreed among other conditions not to enrich uranium domestically, as part of Washington’s efforts to limit nuclear weapons proliferation.

Barakah has proved to be a crucial part of the UAE’s energy security. Its reliable power provides baseload, with the combination of gas and a growing share of solar and batteries supplying peak loads.

Its power is not particularly cheap, but the cost is reasonable. Companies that need low-carbon electricity to meet their environmental objectives, such as Emirates Global Aluminium and Adnoc, have signed up to receive its power.

In July 2024, a UAE government official involved in the nuclear programme said the country was considering building two or four new reactors – and South Korea would not be treated as a favoured bidder.

Saudi Arabia’s path to nuclear power has been longer and more complicated. It wants to mine and enrich its own resources, rather than buying in enrichment services and fuel as the UAE does – hence the comments on uranium exports from energy minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman on January 13.

Access to civil nuclear power technology is a major goal in Riyadh’s discussions with the US over the normalisation of relations with Israel.

Saudi Arabia is moving towards a more comprehensive safeguards protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, it has yet to finalise a 123 agreement with Washington and enrichment remains a stumbling block.

It’s likely that the new Trump administration will be more flexible – and that the UAE will then insist on a similar right to enrichment. The equivalent accords with Japan and India do allow domestic enrichment.

Who will build it?

In August 2023 Riyadh was reportedly considering bids from China, Russia, France and South Korea to build its first nuclear power plant.

China has the world’s largest nuclear power construction programme, with impressive achievements on rapid construction and low costs.

Russia’s Rosatom has been a major exporter of nuclear expertise. It completed Iran’s Bushehr reactor and is building and financing plants in Egypt and Turkey.

But co-operating with Beijing or Moscow on such a high-profile, sensitive and costly project would be very difficult at this moment. Sanctions would probably constrain Russia’s performance anyway.

France’s EDF would be a less problematic choice, but the construction of its latest plant in Normandy has been hit by huge delays and cost overruns.

Kepco did well at Barakah and would surely be the best choice for Riyadh too. But it would face legal challenges because of the lack of a 123 agreement, given the US technology used in its reactors.

Probably for the same reason, the US nuclear power company Westinghouse was not among the mentioned bidders. Its performance on some recent projects has been poor anyway. Saudi Arabia is also keen on a deal with Centrus Energy, a US company that specialises in next-generation reactors.

The insistence on no enrichment is a major problem for US nuclear power policy. It will not be able to compete internationally without rebuilding its expertise and securing large orders, something of a chicken-and-egg situation. 

The Trump administration needs to step in to fix the tangle. 

Marco Rubio, the new secretary of state, is intensely pro-Israel and anti-China. Chris Wright, President Trump’s nominee for energy secretary, is an investor in small modular nuclear reactors. Both are likely to be supportive of reaching a normalisation deal with Saudi Arabia and expanding US nuclear exports.

Robin M Mills is CEO of Qamar Energy and author of The Myth of the Oil Crisis